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Casenotes
THE CLEAN WATER ACT, STANDING, AND THE THIRD
CIRCUIT'S FAILURE TO CLEAN UP THE QUAGMIRE:
PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP OF NEWJERSEY,
INC. v. POWELL DUFFRYN TERMINALS, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
The standing doctrine has been harshly criticized by legal
scholars.' Critics have focused on the federal courts' manipula-
tion of the doctrine in deciding whether or not to reach the merits
of a particular case.2 Such manipulation has created a quagmire
of both strict and liberal applications of the standing require-
ments.3 Nevertheless, environmental group plaintiffs, protecting
our nation's natural resources, have not faced great barriers in
1. For thoughtful criticism of the standing doctrine, see Lee A. Albert,
Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief,
83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Roger Beers, Standing and Related Procedural Hurdles in
Environmental Litigation, 1 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 65 (1986); Raoul Berger, Standing
to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969);
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); Gene R.
Nichol,Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635
(1985) [hereinafter Nichol, Abusing Standing]; Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking
Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68 (1984); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Causation as a Standing
Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 Ky. L.J. 185 (1980-81)
[hereinafter Nichol, Causation]; David M. Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading,
and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 390 (1980); Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the
Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973); Christopher D.
Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S.
CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972); Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for
Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977).
2. E.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 100 (1985) [herein-
after TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES]. Professor Tribe explained:
Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, have displayed an increased
willingness on the Court's part to allow its view of the merits-and the
favor or disfavor with which it views particular kinds of challenges-to
dictate its conclusions as to whether standing requirements have been
met. The result has been the creation of special, largely unprincipled,
exceptions to the basically liberal rules ... to keep out cases of a kind
the Court does not want to deal with .... [C]onverse[ly] . . . the Court
has gone out of its way to consider the merits of particular cases that it
wanted to decide even where . . . standing was at best tenuous under
the standards of the formal rules.
Id.
3. See, e.g., Beers, supra note 1, at 67; Nichol, Abusing Standing, supra note 1,
at 635; TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, supra note 2, at 100.
(179)
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meeting the standing requirements. 4 Despite environmentalists
enjoying very liberal standing requirements, some commentators
and Supreme Court Justices have even suggested that inanimate
objects, such as trees, mountains, and rivers be granted standing
to sue. 5 Recent Supreme Court standing analysis, however,
strongly suggests that environmentalists will have more difficulty
meeting standing requirements in the future. 6
Nevertheless, in Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc.
v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc. (PIRG),7 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, examining standing under the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), added to the
standing quagmire by disregarding recent, more stringent
Supreme Court standing analysis 8 and by expounding a liberal
causal nexus requirement needed to link a plaintiff's injury to a
defendant's conduct.9
This Note briefly discusses the genesis and general intent of
both the Clean Water Act and its "citizen suit" provision. Also, as
a background, the development of constitutional standing re-
quirements is examined. Further, this Note discusses the factual
and procedural history of PIRG, in addition to reprising the
court's standing analysis. The Third Circuit's standing discussion
is also critically examined. Concluding this Note is the recent im-
pact of the Third Circuit's decision on environmental group
plaintiffs.
II. THE CLEAN WATER ACT
The impetus behind Congress's enactment of the Clean
Water Act' 0 was the restoration and maintenance of the "chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters" by
eliminating the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by
1985." The 1972 Clean Water Act represented a significant al-
teration of federal water pollution control policy.' 2 The prior fo-
4. See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
7. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, II1 S. Ct. 1018 (1991). [hereinaf-
ter PIRG].
8. See infra notes 86-95, 155-67 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 133-54, 176-87 and accompanying text.
10. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § § 101-607 [hereinafter CWA], 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
11. CWA § 101(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(l) (1988).
12. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 SENATE
REPORT], reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CON-
2
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cus of federal water pollution control centered on the protection
of receiving waters through quality standards.' 3 This control
measure resulted in enforcement problems because precise efflu-
ent limitations for receiving waters were difficult to establish.' 4
The 1972 Clean Water Act, however, significantly changed the fo-
cus of federal policy. 15 Rather than applying quality standards to
receiving waters, the 1972 Clean Water Act applied effluent limi-
tations to specific polluters.16
The Clean Water Act flatly prohibits the discharge of pollu-
tants, except where authorized by a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit. 17 These permits contain
parameters for the types and concentrations of pollutants a
permitee may discharge.18 The Clean Water Act also requires the
permitee to install and maintain equipment to test its effluent pol-
lution level. 19 The test results are compiled in a Discharge Moni-
toring Report (DMR) and are then reported to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), where non-compliance is discovered by
comparing the reported concentrations to the permit parame-
ters. 20 Section 505 of the Clean Water Act further allows citizens
to sue permit violators. 2'
TROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1425 (1973) [hereinafter 1972 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY]. The 1972 Amendment, unlike its 1965 predecessor, used water qual-
ity as a measure of success rather than a means to success. Id. at 1426.
13. 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 1426. This approach was "limited in its
success" because: (1) many states failed to approve water quality standards; (2)
time schedules were not met; and (3) various disagreements erupted over state-
federal standards. Id.
14. Id. Possibly the greatest limitation was that a proper relationship be-
tween pollution and water quality could not be found. Id.
15. Id. at 1425. The 1972 legislation contained "a major change in the en-
forcement mechanisms of the Federal water pollution control program from
water quality standards to effluent limits." Id.
16. Id. at 1426.
17. CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
18. Id.
19. CWA § 308(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a).
20. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.41(j), 122.48, 136.3 (1991).
21. CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). Section 505 of the Clean
Water Act provides in pertinent part:
[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) . . .alleged to be in
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter
or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect
to such a standard or limitation, or
2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Ad-
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The citizen suit provision of section 505,22 intended to mir-
ror the constitutional standing requirements set forth in Sierra
Club v. Morton,23 was the result of compromise between the House
of Representatives and the Senate. 24 The House bill attempted to
restrict standing to affected citizens within a local area or groups
actively participating in the administrative process. 2 5 In sharp
contrast to the House proposal, the Senate bill permitted "any
person" to sue. 26 In compromise form, section 505 of the Clean
Water Act empowers "citizens" to sue violators. 27 A "citizen" is
defined as "a person or persons having an interest which is or
may be adversely affected."128 A "person," defined for purposes
of the Clean Water Act, includes corporations and associations;
consequently, environmental group plaintiffs qualify as citizens
under the Clean Water Act. 29
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
ARTICLE III STANDING
The standing doctrine is derived from the "case or contro-
versy" requirement of Article III of the Constitution.30 In effect,
Id.
22. See id. and accompanying text.
23. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). For a discussion of Sierra Club, see infra notes 42-
48 and accompanying text.
24. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 16 (1981); Senate Consideration of S. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972), reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 12, at 221; House Con-
sideration of S. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 12, at 249 (1972). See Richard E. Schwartz & David
P. Hackett, Citizen Suits Against Private Industry Under the Clean Water Act, 17 NAT.
RESOURCES LAw. 327, 333-34 n.51 (1984) [hereinafter Schwartz & Hackett].
25. H.R. 11,896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 12, at 1077. The House bill stated:
(g) For the purposes of this section the term 'citizen' means (1) a citi-
zen (A) of the geographic area and (B) having a direct interest which is
or may be affected, and (2) any group of persons which has been ac-
tively engaged in the administrative process and has thereby shown a
special interest in the geographic area in controversy.
Id.
26. S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 Legislative His-
tory, supra note 12, at 1703. The Senate bill stated that "any person may com-
mence a civil action on his own behalf .... " Id.
27. CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). For pertinent part of statute,
see supra note 21.
28. CWA § 505(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g).
29. CWA § 502(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5). See Schwartz & Hackett, supra note
24, at 334.
30. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. For discussions of the caselaw which com-
prises the framework of standing, see Nichol, Causation, supra note 1, at 186-213;
Alison L. Galer, Note, Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell
4
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Article III standing focuses on whether the parties before a fed-
eral court have a sufficient stake in the case's outcome.31 The
modern standing doctrine has evolved into a three-part constitu-
tional test, as outlined in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State: (1) the plaintiff must show
actual or threatened personal injury; (2) the injury must be fairly
traceable to the defendant's action; and (3) the injury must be
redressable through the judicial process. 32 Other. requirements
also exist where a court considers "prudential limitations""3 or
where Congress requires the plaintiff to be within the "zone of
interests" protected by a specific piece of legislation. 34
The first part of the three-part standing construct, whether
the plaintiff has shown actual or threatened personal injury, has
been termed as "injury-in-fact." 3 5 The "injury-in-fact" require-
ment for Article III standing was originally formulated in Associa-
tion of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.3 6 In Data
Processing, providers of data processing services challenged a rul-
ing of the Comptroller of the Currency which permitted national
banks to provide data processing services. 37 The plaintiffs, Data
Processing Services, suing both the Comptroller and the Ameri-
can National Bank & Trust Company (the Bank) under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA), alleged that the competition
created by the Comptroller's ruling would not only result in a loss
of future profit but also had already motivated the Bank to com-
mandeer two of the plaintiff's contractually bound clients.38
Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 127, 132-42 (1991); Michael A.
Perino, Comment,Justice Scalia: Standing, Environmental Law, and the Supreme Court,
15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 134, 144-48 (1987).
31. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972). The focus of standing
analysis is whether "a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable con-
troversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy." Id. at 731.
32. 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) [hereinafter Valley Forge].
33. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). "Prudential considera-
tions" are limitations on standing, other than the minimum constitutional re-
quirements, which a court can use to deny a plaintiff access to federal court, such
as a "generalized grievance" shared by many individuals or a claim based on a
third party interest. Id. at 499. For a discussion of Warth, see infra notes 65-68
and accompanying text.
34. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 156 (1970).
35. Id. at 152.
36. Id. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 79-80
(1978) [hereinafter TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw]. See also Perino, supra note 30,
at 138.
37. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151. The suit was dismissed by the district
court for lack of standing and affirmed by the court of appeals. Id.
38. Id. at 152.
1993] 183
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In its examination of whether Data Processing had standing,
the Supreme Court rejected the standard "legal interest" test and
instead applied an "injury-in-fact" construct.3 9 The Court criti-
cized the "legal interest" test as inappropriately investigating the
merits of a case. 40 The Court found that Data Processing's allega-
tions of the potential loss of future profits and the confiscation of
contractually bound clients was a sufficient "injury-in-fact" to sat-
isfy Article III standing.4 1
In Sierra Club v. Morton, 'the Supreme Court further defined
and broadened what constituted an "injury-in-fact." 42 In Sierra
Club, an environmental group brought suit under the APA against
the United States Forest Service alleging that several federal stat-
utes had been violated when a Walt Disney resort was granted
approval for construction in the Mineral King Valley of the Se-
quoia National Forest.43 The Court explained that an aesthetic
injury could amount to an "injury-in-fact." '44 However, a sincere
interest in the situation was insufficient for Article III standing. 45
Specifically, the plaintiffs themselves had to be among the in-
jured.46 Consequently, a complaint containing affidavits reciting
that the environmental group members used the Mineral King
area for recreational activity would have been sufficient to meet
the "injury-in-fact" test. 47 The environmental group failed to al-
lege use of the Mineral King area in its pleadings or affidavits;
consequently, the Court could not find Article III standing.48
Only one year after its decision in Sierra Club, the Supreme
Court readdressed the "injury-in-fact" requirement and reaf-
firmed the lesson of careful pleading in United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Procedures (SCRAP).49 In SCRAP, an environ-
mental group formed by five law students brought suit under the
39. Id. at 152-57.
40. Id. at 153.
41. Id. at 152.
42. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
43. Id. at 730.
44. Id. at 734-35.
45. Id.
46. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735. The "injury-in-fact" test requires that the
"party seeking review be himself among the injured." Id. The Sierra Club's
"longtime concern" for the use of natural resources was insufficient to grant it
standing. Id. at 736.
47. Id. at 736 n.8.
48. Id. at 735. The Sierra Club did not allege that its members used the
resources of Mineral King or would be affected by any of the proposals to the
Mineral King area. Id.
49. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
6
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APA 50 to force the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to
suspend a railroad rate surcharge. 5' The environmental group
alleged that the ICC's failure to suspend the surcharge would dis-
courage the use of recyclable materials and encourage the use of
new raw materials. 52 Unlike the plaintiffs in Sierra Club, the envi-
ronmental group in SCRAP properly pled that they used the af-
fected area and were directly injured.53 The environmental
group alleged that the rate structure's effect of reducing recycl-
ables would injure them by inflating prices of finished products
and increasing the litter content in the Seattle, Washington
area.
54
In finding that the environmental group members' injuries in
SCRAP satisfied standing requirements, the Supreme Court fur-
ther defined an "injury-in-fact." As indicated in Sierra Club, an
aesthetic injury could still be the basis for standing.55 However,
standing would not be denied simply because many individuals in
the Washington Metropolitan area could claim similar injury. 56
Further, the Court explained that the magnitude of an alleged in-
jury was unimportant with regard to standing,. so long as some
identifiable injury was present.57
The value of SCRAP lies not only in the Court's further defin-
ing an "injury in fact," but also in the lesson of specificity in
pleading. 58 Clearly, the environmental group in SCRAP learned
from the pleading error in Sierra Club and properly pled that they
used the area in question and were directly injured. Conse-
50. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter APA]. Section 10 provides, in pertinent part, "A person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected'or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof." Id.
51. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 675-77.
52. Id. at 676.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 678. The student group also maintained that recreational and
aesthetic value of the area's natural resources had been diminished, as well as
increased pollution and poorer air quality. Id.
55. Id. at 687. For further discussion of Sierra Club, see supra notes 42-48
and accompanying text.
56. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687-88. "[S]tanding is not to be denied simply be-
cause many people suffer the same injury .... " Id. at 687.
57. Id. at 689 n.14. "[A]n identifiable trifle is enough for standing. Id.
(quoting Kenneth Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601,
613 (1968)).
58. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688. The injury alleged by the environmental
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quently, unlike Sierra Club, the Court was able to approach the
question of causation. In SCRAP, the environmental group had
standing despite the obviously tenuous chain of causation. 59 The
railroads argued that the environmental group could never prove
a general rise in freight rates effectuated a simultaneous rise of
pollution levels in the Seattle, Washington area.60 The Court,
however, never truly analyzed the causal chain. The Court noted
that if the causal chain was tenuous, the railroads should have
moved earlier for summary judgment before the district court. 6'
With the demise of the "legal interest test," the advent of the
"injury-in-fact" requirement, and the characterization of an
"identifiable trifle" as the minimally acceptable degree of injury,
the Supreme Court significantly expanded standing.62 Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court fashioned a causation requirement in
an attempt to restrict the expansion of standing created by the
"injury-in-fact" test.63 The Court's attempts to restrict standing
through a causation requirement were revealed through the les-
son of specificity in pleading. 64 In Warth v. Seldin, a plaintiff group
challenged the constitutionality of zoning ordinances allegedly
designed to exclude low and moderate income families. 65
Although the plaintiffs' complaint alleged various injuries, the
Court found the allegations inadequate to establish causation. 66
The Court explained that a plaintiff seeking to challenge the ex-
clusionary zoning practices must allege specific, concrete facts
demonstrating that the challenged practices caused harm. 67 The
Court held that a plaintiff lacked standing to challenge exclusion-
ary zoning schemes by failing to identify specific housing that they
59. Id. at 687. "Here by contrast, the appellees claimed that the specific
and allegedly illegal action . . . would directly harm them in their use of the natural
resources ...... Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 688.
61. Id. at 689. The Court explained that the railroads should have moved
for summary judgment on the standing question and brought forth evidence to
the district court that the students' allegations were false and therefore raised no
issues of genuine fact. Id. Although the Supreme Court ultimately found the
attenuated line of causation satisfactory with regard to the "injury in fact" stan-
dard, "pleadings must be something more than an ingenious academic exercise
in the conceivable." Id. at 688.
62. Nichol, Causation, supra note 1, at 188.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 195. For a discussion of the criticisms of pleading specificity as it
relates to Article III standing, see infra notes 199-207 and accompanying text.
65. 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 505-06.
8
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol4/iss1/8
THE CLEAN WATER ACT
would build or purchase but for the zoning ordinances. 68
The strictness of the standing causation requirement was evi-
denced in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,
where a plaintiff challenged an Internal Revenue Service ruling
which gave a favored tax status to non-profit hospitals that only
provided emergency room service to indigent individuals. 69 In Si-
mon, the Court denied standing because the plaintiffs' injury was
not "fairly traceable" to a defendant's action where no hospital
was a named defendant. 70
However, the apparent strict causation requirement set forth
in Warth and Simon was reduced for environmental plaintiffs in
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group.71 In Duke
Power, the Supreme Court fashioned a more flexible causation re-
quirement for an environmental group that alleged an injury with
a highly attenuated causal chain.72 In Duke Power, environmental
groups, attacking the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act,
brought suit against an investor-owned public utility.73 The envi-
ronmental group alleged that the Price-Anderson Act, in limiting
the liability of a nuclear plant operator, violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 74 In addressing the environmen-
tal group's standing, the Court found that the environmental and
aesthetic consequences of the power plants satisfied the "injury-
in-fact" requirement. 75 However, the question of whether the en-
vironmental group's injuries were "fairly traceable" to the Price-
Anderson Act was more difficult. The Court determined that
there was a "substantial likelihood" that the nuclear plant would
not be completed and operational "but for" the protection of the
Price-Anderson Act.76 The Court found a causal connection be-
cause testimony by industry spokespersons expressed a "categori-
cal unwillingness" to produce nuclear power without limited
68. Id. at 508. See Nichol, Causation, supra note 1, at 194.
69. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
70. Id. at 41-43.
71. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
72. For an in-depth discussion of Duke Power, see TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHOICES, supra note 2, at 106; Nichol, Causation, supra note 1, at 194-96; Perino,
supra note 30, at 147 (characterizing plaintiffs' injuries in Duke Power as "specula-
tive"); Galer, supra note 30, at 146 (characterizing plaintiffs' injuries in Duke
Power as "indirect").
73. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 67.
74. Id. at 69.
75. Id. at 71.
76. Id. at 76-77.
1993]
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liability.77
Although the standing doctrine as applied to environmental
plaintiffs in the 1970's through SCRAP, Sierra Club, and Duke Power
was fairly flexible and easily met by careful pleading, an even
more liberal environmental standing doctrine was suggested by
Justices Douglas and Blackmun in the dissenting opinions of Si-
erra Club 78 and SCRAP.79 The Justices suggested that the stand-
ing doctrine had become too complicated and inflexible;
therefore, their proposed answer was to allow inanimate objects,
such as trees, mountains, and rivers, to have standing.80
Although admittedly an "imaginative expansion" of the tradi-
tional standing concepts, Justice Blackmun explained that such
expansion only added one additional requirement - that the rep-
resentative for the inanimate object be established, knowing, and
sincere. 81 The other requirements, such as a genuine dispute, ad-
versariness, and adequate representational interests, remained
unchanged.82
Although the proposals suggested by Justices Douglas and
Blackmun were not ultimately embraced, standing for environ-
mental plaintiffs was relatively easy to achieve. After Sierra Club
and SCRAP, it was quite obvious that for an environmental plain-
tiff to meet the standing requirements, it would be only necessary
to allege injury and use of the affected environmental resource. 83
Consequently, environmental group plaintiffs historically have
not encountered much difficulty meeting standing require-
ments. 84 Early standing cases revealed that whether an environ-
77. Id. at 75.
78. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
79. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
80. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 741-43 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 757-58 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 758. Justice Blackmun attempted to assuage concerns of a more
radical standing approach by stating, "We need not fear Pandora's box will be
opened or that there will be no limit to . . . environmental litigation .... The
courts will exercise appropriate restraints ... as they have exercised them in the
past." Id.
83. GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTES, INC., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 45
(9th ed. 1987) [hereinafter GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTES]. See Lynn Robinson
O'Donnell, Note, New Restrictions in Environmental Litigation: Standing and Final
Agency Action After Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 2 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 227,
231-32 (1991). Note, however, that the environmental group plaintiff must
identify the specific members injured or standing will be denied. Sierra Club v.
SCM Corp., 580 F. Supp. 862 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984).
84. See Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of Envi-
ronmental Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-
Independent Values, 22 GA. L. REV. 337, 392-93 (1988) (noting that lower courts
10
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mental group met the standing requirements was no more than a
matter of prudent, informed pleading.8 5 Today's Supreme Court,
however, appears to be moving away from the liberal standing
requirements of Sierra Club and SCRAP and towards more rigor-
ous standing requirements.8 6
Recently, in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, the Supreme
Court required more specific allegations by environmental plain-
tiffs to achieve standing.8 7 In Lujan, an environmental group at-
tacked a land withdrawal review program applied by the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM).88 Under the BLM's program, mil-
lions of acres of previously protected lands were reclassified and
exempted from preservation.8 9  The environmental group
brought suit under the APA90 and alleged that the reclassification
violated federal statutes. 91 The Court held that the environmen-
tal group did not have standing under the APA because the envi-
ronmental group's affidavits did not specifically identify the used
lands. 92 The environmental group, facing a motion for summary
judgment, brought forth affidavits of members stating that they
used the lands "in the vicinity" of those affected by the reclassifi-
cation program.93 Although appearing to satisfy the standards
used in SCRAP, the affidavits were insufficient to meet the amount
have been particularly liberal in granting standing to environmental group
plaintiffs); Adeeb Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 9 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 23, 38-39 (1985) (explaining citizen suit provisions, such as § 505
of CWA, have not been substantial hurdle for environmental group plaintiffs).
85. See supra notes 42-61 and accompanying text.
86. See generally Perino, supra note 30, at 156 n. 172 (citing The Supreme Court
and Environmental Law: A Whole New Ballgame?, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,626 (July 1984)).
87. 111 S. Ct. 3177 (1990). For a complete discussion of Lujan, see BillJ.
Hays, Comment, Standing and Environmental Law: Judicial Policy and the Impact of
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 39 KAN. L. REV. 997 (1991); Robinson
O'Donnell, supra note 83, at 227; Sara A. Robichaud, Note, Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation: The Supreme Court Tightens the Reigns on Standing for Environ-
mental Groups, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 443 (1991); Katherine B. Steuer & Robin L.
Juni, Note, Court Access for Environmental Plaintiffs: Standing Doctrine in Lujan v. Na-
tional Wildlife Federation, 15 HARV. ENVrL. L. REV. 187 (1991); Stu Stuller,
Note, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 933 (1991).
88. Lujan, 111 S. Ct. at 3182.
89. Id.
90. See supra note 50.
91. The environmental group alleged violations of the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988), and the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1988). Lujan, 111
S. Ct. at 3182.
92. Lujan, 111 S. Ct. at 3186-87 (citing Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 740).
93. Id. at 3187-88 (quoting National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp.
327, 331 (D.D.C. 1988)).
1993]
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of specificity required to survive a motion for summary judg-
ment.94 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, distinguished
SCRAP not only on its facts, but also by the type of motion in-
volved. SCRAP involved a motion to dismiss which requires less
specificity in pleading than does a summary judgment motion. 95
IV. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP OF NEW JERSEY, INC. V.
POWELL DUFFRYN TERMINALS, INC. (PIRG)
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
In PIRG,96 the defendant permit holder, Powell Duffryn Ter-
minals (PDT), operated a bulk chemical storage facility in Ba-
yonne, New Jersey. 97 PDT was situated on approximately thirty
acres adjacent to the highly industrialized Kill Van Kull (the Kill)
waterway. 98 PDT operated a service which stores clients' chemi-
cal commodities for later transportation.99 When transferring the
chemicals, some spillage, overflow, and condensation were mixed
with rainwater and captured by PDT's collection system which
discharges the effluent through a four-inch pipe into the Kill.' 00
Since 1977, PDT had monitored its discharge into the Kill
through a series of NPDES permits.' 0 ' However, the DMRs ex-
amined over that period indicated that PDT "consistently and un-
interruptedly" discharged pollutants in excess of that allowed by
its NPDES permit.' 0 2 The environmental group plaintiffs, Public
Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. and Friends of the
Earth (collectively PIRG) filed suit against PDT under section 505
94. Lujan, 111 S. Ct. at 3189.
95. Id. Justice Scalia, in distinguishing SCRAP, explained:
The SCRAP opinion, whose expansive expression.., under its particu-
lar facts has never since been emulated by this Court ... involved not a
Rule 56 motion for summary judgment but a Rule 12(b) motion to dis-
miss .... The latter, unlike the former, presumes that general allega-
tions embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the
claim.
Id. at 3189. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
96. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018 (1991).
97. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 68.
98. Student Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell
Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1074, 1080 (D.N.J. 1986) [hereinafter
PIRG I], aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1018 (1991).
99. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 68.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 69.
102. Id.
12
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of the Clean Water Act.10 3 The plaintiffs alleged that PDT was
violating its NPDES permit, and thus sought a judgment of liabil-
ity, civil penalties, and injunctive relief. i0 4
The Federal District Court of New Jersey bifurcated the case,
first determining whether liability existed in Student Public Interest
Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc.
(PIRG I).105 Civil penalties and injunctive relief were considered
afterward in Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v.
Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc. (PIRG II). 106 In PIRG I, PIRG moved
for summary judgment on the liability issue. 10 7 PDT opposed the
motion arguing that PIRG lacked standing and that material facts
as to liability were in dispute.' 08 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment to PIRG. 10 9 The district court found that PIRG
had standing and that PDT violated its NPDES permit numerous
times over a seven year period." l0 Shortly thereafter, the court
granted PIRG a second and third summary judgment on addi-
tional PDT violations."' In between the second and third sum-
mary judgment motions, PIRG was unsuccessful in moving for a
preliminary injunction to stop further permit violations."l 2 In
PIRG II, the district court found that PDT had consistently vio-
lated its NPDES permit and should be fined the maximum pen-
alty.11' However, the penalty was reduced because EPA and the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP)
were lax in prosecuting PDT.'I 4 The district court ordered PDT
to pay the penalty into a trust fund to finance the improvement of
New Jersey's environment and entered a permanent injunction
prohibiting future violations.' 15
103. Id. at 69. For a discussion of § 505 of the CWA, see supra notes 10-29
and accompanying text.
104. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 69.
105. 627 F. Supp. 1074 (D.N.J. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 913 F.2d 64(3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018 (1991).
106. 720 F. Supp. 1158 (D.N.J. 1989) [hereinafter PIRG II], aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018 (1991).
107. PIRG I, 627 F. Supp. at 1078.
108. Id. at 1078, 1080.
109. Id. at 1090.
110. Id. at 1081-83, 1085-89.
111. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 69.
112. Id.
113. PIRG M, 720 F. Supp. at 1166. The district court assessed the maxium
penalty totaling $4,205,000. Id.
114. Id. The maximum penalty was reduced by $1,000,000. Id. at 1166-67.
115. Id. at 1168. Rather than place the penalty money into the United
States Treasury, the district court felt a New Jersey trust fund would properly
1993]
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Both PDT and PIRG appealed to the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals. 1" 6 PDT argued that PIRG did not have standing; that
the district court improperly held that no statute of limitations
was applicable; and that summary judgment was wrongly granted
on the issue of liability." 7 Further, PDT attacked the district
court's factual conclusions supporting civil penalties and argued
that the injunction was overbroad.' 8 PIRG contended that EPA
and NJDEP's failure to prosecute should not reduce PDT's pen-
alty. 119 The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in
finding that PIRG had standing;' 20 summary judgment against
PDT was not clearly erroneous;' 21 and the permanent injunction
direct the funds where needed and "vindicate" the efforts of the environmental
group plaintiffs. Id.
116. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 68.
117. Id. at 70.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 71-76.
121. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 76-77. PDT made three arguments in objecting to
the district court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of liability. Id. at 76.
PDT first argued that the single operational upset (SOU) defense of 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(c)(5), (d), (g)( 3 ) indicated congressional intent that a single discharge
which violates several permit violations amounts to a single violation. Id. at 76-
77. The court of appeals examined EPA guidelines and determined that SOU
meant some "unusual or extraordinary" event. Id. The court found that PDT
did not offer any evidence of an exceptional event and noted that it was "disin-
genuous at best" for PDT to claim it was in a continuous state of upset for the
six years at issue in the lawsuit. Id. Consequently, PDT was not entitled to the
SOU defense. Id.
Second, PDT argued that the district court improperly found it was liable
for exceeding biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and total suspended solids
(TSS). Id. PDT maintained that BOD and TSS limitations were applicable only
to continuous dischargers and not an intermittent discharger, such as PDT. Id.
The court of appeals disagreed, however, noting that under New Jersey law, a
permitee must request agency review 30 days from the receipt of its permit. Id.
at 78 (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 14A-8.9). Here, because PDT had not
challenged the BOD and TSS limits in an earlier agency proceeding, PDT could
not raise the issue before the court of appeals. Id.
Third, PDT argued that the district court improperly granted summary
judgment on violations that were "double counted" by PIRG. Id. PDT gave two
examples of the alleged overcounting. First, PDT argued a single exceedance
was counted as both a violation of the average and maximum concentration lim-
its. Id. The court of appeals held that the daily average and daily maximum
concentration limits were "clearly separate limitations," thus, PDT should be
penalized for exceeding both. Id. Second, PDT argued that the district court
improperly counted a single exceedance as a violation of both the 7 and 30 day
average limitations. Id. Here, the court of appeals restated that the SOU de-
fense was not available to PDT. Id. at 78-79. The court did note, however, that
it was possible that the district court undercounted the number of violations. Id.
at 79 n.29. The Eleventh Circuit interpreted section 1319(d) as requiring that a
violation of the 30 day average limitation be counted as 30 violations. Id. (citing
Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1139-40 (1 1th
14
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was proper. 22 However, the circuit court reversed the district
court and held that a five year statute of limitations applied and
remanded the case to the district court for an adjustment of the
penalty.' 23 Further, the circuit court reversed the reduction in
Cir. 1990)). However, since PIRG waived this argument at trial, the court of
appeals did not reconsider the district court's possible error. Id.
122. Id. at 82-83. The district court's permanent injunction stated, in perti-
nent part:
[PDT] is hereby restrained and enjoined from making any discharges
into the Kill Van Kull from its waste plant in Bayonne, New Jersey that
exceed any limitation and/or fail in any way to comply with the terms
and conditions of the NPDES [permit] . .. including its present permit
• . . any and all additions and/or amendments and any and all permits
that may hereafter be issued by any agency, state or federal, that is is-
sued pursuant to the Clean Water Act.
Id. (quoting PIRG II, 720 F. Supp. at 1169). The court of appeals noted that a
permanent injunction is proper only "after a showing of both irreparable injury
and inadequacy of legal remedies, and a balancing of competing claims of injury
and the public interest." Id. at 83 (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council
v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 906 F.2d 934, 941 (3d Cir. 1990)). PDT argued
that because there was no evidence of irreparable injury, the district court im-
properly granted the permanent injunction. Id. The appellate court noted that
the district court, in an unpublished opinion, originally denied PIRG's motion
for a preliminary injunction because it was not persuaded that irreparable harm
was impending. Id. The district court originally denied PIRG's motion for a
preliminary injunction because PDT's DMRs indicated great improvement with
its permit compliance. Id. However, PDT again violated its permit after the dis-
trict court denied PIRG's earlier motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. The
appellate court concluded that since PDT had violated its permit after PIRG's
motion was denied, the district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the
permanent injunction. Id.
PDT also argued that the district court's order was an overbroad "obey the
law" because it enjoined PDT from violating both present and future permits.
Id. The appellate court limited the permanent injunction to the permit existing
"at the time of the action." Id. Consequently, the portion of the permanent
injunction that enjoined PDT from violating any future Clean Water Act permits
was removed from the permanent injunction. Id.
123. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 75-76. The district court decided that a statute of
limitations should not be applied to citizen lawsuits brought under the Clean
Water Act. Id. at 74. PDT argued that the five year statute of limitations con-
tained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 should be applied. Id. at 73-74. In contrast, PIRG
argued that 33 U.S.C. § 1370 authorizes states to implement stricter require-
ments against polluters than federal law. Id. at 74. However, New Jersey im-
posed no limitations period on similar lawsuits brought under state
environmental law. Id. Consequently, PIRG maintained that the stricter state
procedural rule should prevail and no limitations period should be applied. Id.
Although recognizing that ordinarily a federal court would follow state law and
borrow its limitations period where a federal statute contains no limitations pe-
riod, the court of appeals decided that the five year limitations period imposed
on the government under 28 U.S.C. § 2462 would apply. Id. The court ex-
plained that since plaintiffs suing under a citizen suit provision are acting as an
"adjunct" to government enforcement, they should be subject to the same stat-
ute of limitations. Id.
PIRG also argued that if a five year statute of limitations period was applica-
ble, the time period should begin when the defendant files its DMRs rather than
19931
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penalties due to EPA's and NJDEP's nonfeasance and remanded
for recalculation of penalties. 124 Finally, without appeal by either
at the time of the discharge. Id. at 75. The appellate court agreed with PIRG
and held that the five year limitations period does not begin until the DMRs
enumerating the violations are filed. Id. The appellate court reasoned that it
would be unlikely that the public would know of any violation until the DMRs
are filed, because the defendant has responsibility for monitoring the effluent.
Id.
PIRG, however, further argued that the statute of limitations period should
be suspended from the time the plaintiffs file their 60 day notice letter until the
filing of the complaint. Id. The appellate court disagreed and held that the stat-
ute of limitations is suspended only for the 60 day. notice period. Id. at 76. The
court explained that the limitations period should not be suspended until the
lawsuit is filed because that would allow citizens to file the 60 day notice and
then delay filing the complaint which could ultimately extend the limitations pe-
riod beyond five years. Id. The appellate court's application of the five year
statute of limitations resulted in the removal of 12 of PDT's violations. Id. at 76
n. 17.
124. Id. at 79-81. The Clean Water Act enumerates several factors in
§ 309(d) that a district court must weigh when imposing civil penalties:
In determining the amount of civil penalty the court shall consider the
seriousness of the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any)
resulting from the violation, any history of such violations, any good-
faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, the economic
impact of the penalty on the violator, and such other matters as justice
may require.
Id. at 79 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)).
Although the district court imposed the maximum penalty for each of PDT's
violations, it reduced the total amount by $1,000,000.00 because EPA and
NJDEP did not diligently prosecute PDT. Id. PDT argued that the district
court's fact finding on the seriousness of the violations and the economic benefit
of noncompliance was clearly erroneous. Id. The court of appeals disagreed
and found that the district court's fact finding on the both the seriousness of the
violations and the economic benefit to PDT was not clearly erroneous. Id. at 79-
80. The court of appeals noted that in determining the seriousness of the viola-
tions the district court properly relied on EPA reports and the "large number of
gross exceedances" in finding that PDT's violations were serious. Id. at 79. Fur-
ther, the court of appeals held that the district court was not clearly erroneous in
concluding that PDT's economic benefit from noncompliance far exceeded the
statutory maximum. Id. at 80. PDT argued that the district court, in determin-
ing whether it exceeded the statutory maximum for economic benefit due to
noncompliance, improperly based its conclusions by using testimony of PDT's
own expert witnesses. Id. The appellate court disagreed and noted that the dis-
trict court "would have been remiss" if it had not considered such "highly pro-
bative" evidence. Id.
Also, PIRG argued that the district court's reduction of PDT's penalty be-
cause EPA and NJDEP failed to diligently prosecute PDT was improper as a
matter of law. Id. at 79-81. On this issue, the court agreed with PIRG and re-
versed the district court's reduction of the penalty. Id. at 81. The court of ap-
peals reasoned that where the permittee has in a good faith attempt failed to
comply with permit limitations because of technical problems or where EPA had
"affirmatively recognized and excused noncompliance justice may require" an
adjustment of the penalty. Id. Although the district court reduced the penalty, it
found that PDT did not act in good faith. Id. Consequently, the court of appeals
reversed the district court's reduction of the penalty and remanded for a recal-
culation. Id.
16
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party, the circuit court reversed the district court's order creating
a New Jersey environmental trust fund and remanded with in-
structions that the penalties be paid to the United States
Treasury. 25
B. The Third Circuit's Standing Analysis
The appeal to the Third Circuit centered on the question of
whether PIRG met the constitutional requirements for standing.
PIRG sought to represent the concerns of its members; therefore,
the court of appeals began its analysis by examining the appropri-
ateness of "representational standing" in the case. 126 The court
explained that "representational standing" is appropriate where:
(1) the group's members would have individual standing; (2) the
interests the group is attempting to protect are "germane" to the
group's objective; and (3) individual participation is unnecessary
for the claim or relief requested. 27 PDT argued that because
PIRG's individual members lacked standing, PIRG lacked
standing. ' 28
The court of appeals, using the three-prong Valley Forge test,
determined that PIRG's members had individual standing and
125. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 81-82. Although neither PIRG nor PDT appealed
the'district court's order that PDT's civil penalties be paid into a trust fund for
New Jersey environmental problems rather than the United States Treasury, the
court of appeals granted leave for EPA to intervene to contest the issue. Id. at
81. The court of appeals noted that although the Clean Water Act does not
specifically address where the civil penalties are to be paid, the legislative history
clearly suggests that Congress intended such payments to be made to the United
States Treasury. Id. Congress intended that civil penalties be deposited as "mis-
cellaneous receipts." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 133
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745). Under the Miscellaneous
Receipts Act, any individual holding public funds is required to deposit the
funds in the Treasury within three days of receipt. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C.
§ 3302(c)(1) (1988)). Further, the court of appeals observed that "courts have
consistently stated that penalties in citizen suits under the Act must be paid to
the Treasury." Id. at 82 (citing Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d
1109, 1113 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989); Gwaltney v. Chesa-
peake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 n.25 (1981); Sierra Club v. Elec-
tronic Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990); Atlantic States
Legal Found. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1131 n.5 (11 th Cir. 1990);
Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1522 (9th Cir. 1987)). Con-
sequently, the court of appeals reversed the district court's order crafting the
New Jersey trust fund and ordered that PDT's civil penalties be paid to the
Treasury. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 82.
126. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 70.
127. Id. (citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S.




Carine: The Clean Water Act, Standing, and the Third Circuit's Failure to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
196 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IV: p. 179
therefore, PIRG also had standing.' 2 9 Under the Valley Forge test,
standing is determined by three requirements: (1) "injury-in-fact"
to plaintiffs; (2) the injury must be fairly traceable to the defend-
ant; and (3) the injury must be redressable by a favorable deci-
sion. 13 To determine whether PIRG's individual members
satisfied the three-prong Valley Forge test, the court of appeals ex-
amined the affidavits of five PIRG members. 13 1 All of the affiants
stated that they were members of PIRG, lived in the vicinity of the
Kill Van Kull and suffered injury to their aesthetic and recrea-
tional interests as a result of pollution of the Kill. 132
The court of appeals, in examining the affidavits, found that
all three prongs of the Valley Forge test were satisfied. 133 The first
requirement, that the plaintiff suffered some "injury-in-fact," was
easily satisfied and unchallenged by PDT.' 34 The affiants claimed
injury to their aesthetic and recreational interests because of the
pollution of the Kill. 135 Harm to aesthetic and recreational inter-
ests is sufficient to provide standing. 136 Although an extensive
injury is not required and an "identifiable trifle" is sufficient to
confer standing, the court clearly recognized the materiality of
the affiants' injury. 137
The second requirement, that the injury be "fairly traceable"
to the defendant, was also satisfied but contested by PDT. 138 In
support of its earlier motion for summary judgment, PDT submit-
ted several affidavits by engineering consultants. 139 The affidavits
129. Id. at 70-73.
130. Id. at 70 (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472). This Note focuses
upon the "injury-in-fact" and "fairly traceable" elements of Article III standing.
131. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 71-73.
132. Id. at 71.
133. Id. at 73.
134. Id. at 71.
135. Id.
136. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 71 (quoting SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689 n.14). For a
discussion of SCRAP, see supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
137. Id. "The interests asserted by the plaintiffs in this case are more than
trifles." Id. See also Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57,
61 (2d Cir. 1985) (member's affidavit stating that he frequently passed by offen-
sive body of water was sufficient to confer standing).
138. Id. at 71-73.
139. Id. at 71. Affidavit of LeRoy Sullivan, engineering consultant, stated
that there was "a reasonable scientific certainty . . . [PDT's] operations do not
adversely affect water quality in the Kill ... or ... Kill Van Kull Park . . . other
location except perhaps in some purely speculative and theoretical way." Id. at
71-72 (quoting Sullivan Aff. 2 at 93); Affidavit of Allen Dresdner, professional
planner-consultant, stated that the poor Kill water conditions did "not originate
from [PDT] nor are they related to [PDT's] discharges." Id. at 72 (quoting Dres-
dner Aff. 9 18 at 126).
18
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol4/iss1/8
THE CLEAN WATER ACT
professed that PDT's operations did not have a deleterious effect
upon the Kill's water quality and that the unfortunate condition of
the Kill was unrelated to PDT's discharges. 140 The district court
found that the NPDES permit violations alone were enough to
show causation. 14 1 PDT argued that a strong causal connection
was required. 142 The court of appeals refused to adopt the polar-
ity of either assessment. Strict tort causation was not required;
however, something more than permit violations was necessary to
meet the "fairly traceable" requirement. 143 Instead, plaintiffs
would have to demonstrate that there is a "substantial likelihood"
that the defendant's action caused the plaintiffs' injury. 144 This
"substantial likelihood" is established by showing that: (1) the de-
fendant discharged some pollutant in excess of its permit; (2) the
discharged pollutant is in a waterway in which the plaintiffs have
an interest that is or may be adversely affected by the pollutant;
and (3) the pollutant causes or contributes to the types of harm
alleged by the plaintiffs. 145 In examining these requirements, the
court of appeals again turned to the affidavits of several group
members who stated that the Kill had an oily or greasy appear-
ance which they found offensive.146 PDT's discharge permits lim-
ited the amounts of oil and grease it could discharge; 147 however,
its DMRs indicated that it discharged oil and grease in excess of
the permit limits. 14 8 Consequently, the court found that the aes-
thetic harm suffered by the affiants could be "fairly traceable" to
PDT's discharge.14 9
The third Valley Forge requirement, that plaintiffs demon-
strate their injuries are redressable by a favorable decision, was
also satisfied.15 0 PDT argued that neither injunctive relief nor
civil penalties could redress the injuries alleged by PIRG's mem-
140. Id. at 71-72.
141. PIRG I, 627 F. Supp. at 1083. Other district courts have also con-
cluded that a permit violation alone is enough to satisfy the causation require-
ment. See infra note 181.
142. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 72.
143. Id. The "fairly traceable" element does not require the plaintiffs to
show with "scientific certainty" that defendant's effluent itself caused the specific
injury to the plaintiffs. Id. Tort causation is not required. Id. (citing Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78 (1978)).
144. Id. (quoting Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 75 n.20).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 73 n.9.
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bers.' 5 1 The court of appeals explained that injunctive relief
would redress PIRG's grievance of water quality damage due to
permit excesses because forced compliance with its permit would
lower the level of Kill pollution. 52 Civil penalties were also ap-
propriate because plaintiffs' showing of a "distinct and palpable"
injury could "invoke the general public interest in support of
their claim."' t 53 Such penalties would serve the public interest by
encouraging not only PDT but also other NPDES permit holders
to comply with their effluent limits.154
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. "Injury-in-Fact"
Judge Aldisert, in his concurring opinion of PIRG, analo-
gized PIRG's recruitment of injured individuals to satisfy stand-
ing requirements with an "old-time vaudeville performer's
ad." 55 Simply, PIRG had a case and needed "live bodies" suffi-
ciently injured to meet the standing requirements. 56 Neverthe-
less, Judge Aldisert conceded that the recruited, "live-bodied
members/plaintiffs" established a sufficient "injury-in-fact" to
move on to the causation tier of Article III standing
requirements. '57
Although Judge Aldisert had greater problems in finding that
PIRG's averments met the causation requirement, two issues
presented the question of whether PIRG met the "injury-in-fact"
requirement. First, what level of geographical specificity should
be required by the members of an environmental group who al-
lege use of the natural resource at issue?' 58 Second, should the
environmental group be required to show that either its recruited
members or the local community support the action against the
alleged polluter? 59
151. Id.
152. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 73.
153. Id. (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 501).
154. Id.
155. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 84. (Aldisert, J., concurring). Judge Aldisert char-
acterized the environmental groups "in the position of the old-time vaudeville
performer's as in Variety: 'Have tux, will travel.' " Id.
156. Id. at 84-85.
157. Id.
158. For a discussion of the extent to which geographic specificity is re-
quired to be alleged to meet Article III standing requirements, see infra notes
160-67 and accompanying text.
159. For a discussion of whether local community support is required
under Article III standing, see infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
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In Lujan, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the
affiants for an environmental group plaintiff must allege use or
enjoyment of the specific area in question to satisfy the "injury-in-
fact" requirement of Article III standing. 160 This appeared to di-
rectly conflict with SCRAP where use or enjoyment in the vicinity
of the area in question sufficiently satisfied the "injury-in-fact" re-
quirement. 161 Justice Scalia, however, distinguished the unfa-
vored "expansive" SCRAP opinion by noting that SCRAP involved
a 12(b) motion to dismiss versus a Rule 56 motion for summary
judgment. 162 As in Lujan, PIRG involved a summary judgment
motion. 163 Consequently, by applying the Lujan distinction,
PIRG's affidavits should have been subject to a more stringent
standard because as in Lujan, PIRG's affiants stated that they lived
or recreated in the vicinity of the affected area. 164
Notwithstanding the Lujan opinion, it remains unclear
whether geographical specificity is required for standing under
the Clean Water Act. Prior cases under the Clean Water Act are
inconsistent as to the degree of geographical specificity needed
for standing.' 65 Some cases require allegations of resource use
while others require a nexus with the geographical area in ques-
tion. 166 Unfortunately, the PIRG majority opinion fails to address
Lujan or other Clean Water Act cases to clarify the degree of geo-
graphical specificity required. 167
Another argument that questions whether PIRG met the "in-
160. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 111 S. Ct. 3177, 3187-89 (1990).
Justice Scalia's approach towards standing and particularly how his stance onjudicial restraint and separation of powers would restrict environmental group
access to the federal courts was brilliantly predicted and explained in Perino,
supra note 30, at 136; see also Robinson O'Donnell, supra note 83, at 229.
161. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 678 (1973). The members in SCRAP alleged
that they used the natural resources of the surrounding affected area. Id.
162. Lujan, 111 S. Ct. at 3189. Justice Scalia confined SCRAP to its facts
and explained that "[t]he SCRAP opinion . . .is of no relevance here, since it
involved not a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment but a rule 12(b) motion to
dismiss on the pleadings." Id. For completely thorough discussions of Justice
Scalia's Lujan-SCRAP distinction, see Robinson O'Donnell, supra note 83, at 240-
41; Steuer &Juni, supra note 87, at 202-05.
163. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 71. PDT originally challenged PIRG's standing
through a motion to dismiss; however, because additional evidence was brought
forth on the issue, the district court treated the motion as one for summary judg-
ment. Id.
164. Id. The court stated that "PIRG asserted generally in its complaint
that its members resided in the vicinity of or owned property on or near the Kill
Van Kull, or recreated on or near the Kill Van Kull." Id. (emphasis added).
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jury-in-fact" prerequisite is that environmental organizations,
purporting to represent the interests of their injured members,
should be required to offer proof of either local or individual sup-
port of the litigation.' 68 Industry commentators have suggested
that Congress intended the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provi-
sion to enable local individuals to band together and attack local
pollution activities.' 69 This intent, however, has not been real-
ized since most suits have been brought by national environmen-
tal groups whose pleadings are without allegations of local
support.' 70 The demonstration of individual support of the liti-
gation stems from the idea that the suit should reflect the wishes
of the injured individual. 171 Presently, however, only a member's
authority to litigate is necessary. 172 Such authority is simply
shown by affidavits of members alleging the required standing el-
ements.'T7 The members' procurement of affidavits itself demon-
strates the authorization of the organization to litigate in their
place. 174 Nevertheless, the weakness of a reliance on affidavits to
obviate authorization by the real party in interest becomes clear,
as in PIRG, where deposition testimony shows far less support for
litigation. In PIRG, although affidavits of five members satisfied
standing requirements, the deposition testimony showed that the
affiants had marginal support for the litigation against PDT.175
168. William S. Jordan, III, Citizen Litigation Under the Clean Water Act: The
Second Circuit Renews Its Leadership Role in Environmental Law, 52 BROOK. L. REV.
829, 841-42 (1986); Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 24, at 342.
169. Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 24, at 342 (explaining that Congress
"envisioned local citizen groups challenging local activities"); cf. Jordan, supra
note 168, at 843 n.84 (asserting litigants with sufficient stake in outcome were
envisioned to pursue adversarial proceeding).
170. E.g., Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 24, at 342.
171. E.g., Jordan, supra note 168, at 843. The argument that a citizen's
wishes should be reflected in the litigation expresses the concern that the indi-
vidual represented by the organization be the real party in interest. Id. The
argument also reflects the possibility of restricting the organization where it
does not act on behalf of the interests of the represented individual. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. If the represented members disagree with the organization repre-
senting their interests, they can remove their authorizations. Id.
175. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 87-88 (Aldisert, J., concurring). The deposition of
C. Cummings revealed that she never read the complaint, did not think the out-
come of the suit would have a personal effect on her, and that PIRG's allegations
were never explained to her. Id. at 87. Deposition of S. Abrams revealed that he
had no personal claim against PDT. Id. at 88. Deposition of D. MacNeil stated
that he never asserted that PDT's discharges directly injured him. Id.
22
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B. The Causation Requirement
Judge Aldisert's concurring opinion in PIRG expressed a
deep concern over whether the circuit court's conclusions on
standing would survive Supreme Court review.' 76 Judge Aldisert,
convinced PDT was an intentional polluter and deserving of pun-
ishment, 177 nevertheless questioned whether the "live bodies"
used by PIRG as affiants satisfied the standing requirements, es-
pecially in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan.' 78 Ac-
knowledging that Lujan was not precise precedential authority
because it construed neither Article III standing nor standing
under the Clean Water Act,179 Judge Aldisert was concerned that
the circuit court was not following the more stringent spirit of
Lujan.18 0
Although not acknowledging Lujan, the PIRG majority re-
futed the district court's assertion that a mere permit violation
alone could satisfy the "fairly traceable" element of the Valley
Forge test.' 8 ' The majority recognized that under the Duke Power
causation construct the plaintiffs would have to show a "substan-
tial likelihood" that the defendant's conduct caused plaintiffs' in-
juries to satisfy the "fairly traceable" test. 8 2 However, the PIRG
majority manufactured its own definition of the Duke Power "sub-
176. Id. at 83. Judge Aldisert expressed that "[t]he standing case put in by
[PIRG] is so skinny that I am concerned seriously that our discussion will not
survive careful Supreme Court review." Id.
177. Id. at 85. Judge Aldisert commented that "[w]hat makes this case so
difficult is that [PDT] is an egregious wrongdoer .... [A] persuasive argument
can be made that as a business decision, it deliberately chose to exceed the dis-
charges allowed ...." Id.
178. Id. at 84-85. Judge Aldisert recognized that Lujan directed that gen-
eral averments were not to be assumed as the specific facts needed to find stand-
ing. Id. at 84.
179. Id. at 84.
180. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 84. Judge Aldisert noted that if a more stringent
requirement was necessary under the APA, then, a fortiori, some form of the
stringent requirements apply to Article III standing. Id.
181. Id. at 72 (quoting PIRG I, 627 F. Supp. at 1083). In federal district
courts, however, causation has been shown by proving that the defendant ex-
ceeded its discharge permit. See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Universal
Tool & Stamping Co., 735 F. Supp. 1401, 1412 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (presuming
causation where plaintiff shows defendant violated discharge permit); NRDC v.
Outboard Marine Corp., 692 F. Supp. 801, 807-08 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (determining
more than proof of permit violation to satisfy causation would "compel a stricter
showing for standing than for liability"); SPIRG v. Tenneco Polymers, Inc., 602
F. Supp. 1394, 1397 (D.N.J. 1985) (finding violation of discharge permit satisfies
causal element); SPIRG v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419, 1424
(D.N.J. 1985) (holding violation of discharge permit itself was sufficient to satisfy
causal element).
182. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 72 (quoting Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 75 n.20).
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stantial likelihood" test. A "substantial likelihood" exists where
the plaintiff shows that the defendant has "(1) discharged some
pollutant in concentrations greater than allowed by its permit (2)
into a waterway in which the plaintiffs have an interest that is or
may be affected by the pollutant and that (3) this pollutant causes
or contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged by the plaintiffs." 8 3
The court of appeals' own three-prong definition of the Duke
Power "substantial likelihood" test was intended to "require more
than showing a mere exceedance of a permit limit" to establish
causation. 84 However, in PIRG, affiants satisfied the causation
requirement by claiming they were personally offended by some-
thing discharged in excess of PDT's permit limitations. 8 5 In
PIRG, the affiants stated they were offended by the oily, greasy
sheen of the Kill.' 8 6 PDT's discharge contained oil and grease in
excess of its permit; consequently, the aesthetic injury was "fairly
traceable" to PDT. 8 7
Uncomfortable with the feigned stringency set forth by the
majority's causation analysis, Judge Aldisert reexamined whether
the injuries alleged by the affiants were "fairly traceable" to
PDT.'88 Judge Aldisert recognized that the Kill was already a
highly industrialized ecological disaster;' 8 9 therefore, it was diffi-
cult to trace the affiants' injuries to any one specific polluter. 190
Judge Aldisert, acknowledging the Supreme Court's direction in
Lujan, that general averments are not assumed to be the specific
facts required to find standing, searched for a stronger "link" be-
183. Id. The court further noted that in order to attain standing, a plaintiff
"need not sue every discharger in one action, since the pollution of any one may
be shown to cause some part of the injury suffered." Id. at 72 n.8 (citing SCRAP,
412 U.S. at 689 n.14).
184. Id. at 72. The court explained that "if a plaintiff has alleged some
harm, that the waterway is unable to support aquatic life for example, but failed
to show that defendant's effluent contains pollutants that harm aquatic life, then
plaintiffs would lack standing." Id. at 72-73.
185. Id. at 73 n.9.
186. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 72 n.9.
187. Id. at 85 (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471 (citations omitted)).
188. Id. at 86. Judge Aldisert, recognizing the industrial nature of the area
and the poor condition of the Kill, explained that "[t]he Kill lost its pristine
beauty many years ago ...." Id.
189. Id. In this case, an "egregious polluter" discharged into an "already
polluted industrial waterway located in a severely threatened ecosystem." Id.
But cf. SPIRG v. Tenneco Polymers, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1394, 1396-97 (D.N.J.
1985) (finding standing where body of water was already polluted and direct
impact impossible to pinpoint).
190. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 89 (Aldisert, J., concurring).
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tween PDT's discharges and the affiants' injuries. 19 1 Judge Aldis-
ert noted that the affiants only complained of pollution in general
and did not allege that their specific injuries were caused by
PDT.192 Nevertheless, Judge Aldisert agreed with the majority
and found that PIRG satisfied the standing requirements.
93
Although somewhat uncomfortable in his decision, Judge Aldisert
was assuaged that the evolving standing requirements "are per-
haps expanded a bit when at stake are the great public policy con-
siderations of insults to our environment."'' 94
Judge Aldisert's search for a stronger causal standing re-
quirement has been considered by other courts and commenta-
tors alike. 195 Such an exploration is similar to an industry
grievance that individuals alleging injury cannot identify the de-
fendant as the specific polluter that caused the injury. 196 This
more stringent causation argument has been rebuffed as function-
ally unrealistic because such a task would be extraordinarily bur-
densome and would require extensive research on behalf of the
individual.' 97 Further, a more stringent requirement would con-
flict with the Congressional intent of the citizen suit provision in
removing "burdensome prerequisites." 1 9 8
C. The Return of Fact Pleading
Requiring environmental groups to plead geographic speci-
ficity, local support for litigation, or a more definitive causal chain
to satisfy standing requirements would result in an apparent re-
birth of the long-abolished fact pleading standard.' 99 Critics of
191. Id.
192. Id. at 88-89.
193. Id. at 88.
194. Id. at 89.
195. SeeJordan, supra note 168, at 842; Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 24,
at 341.
196. See Jordan, supra note 168, at 844; see also Schwartz & Hackett, supra
note 24, at 341.
197. See Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 24, at 341-42.
198. Id. Such "burdensome prerequisites" would require extensive re-
search to determine the biological impact of a certain violation - this type of
showing would be beyond the means of most individuals and some citizen
groups. Id. However, computer modeling is becoming more widely available
and has been used in tracing pollutants. See, e.g., Marathon Oil v. EPA, 830 F.2d
1346, 1348-49 (5th Cir. 1987) (examining EPA's use of computer modeling to
analyze discharge's effect on water quality standards); NRDC v. Zeller, 688 F.2d
706, 714 (11 th Cir. 1982) (upholding validity of inter-agency agreement requir-
ing use of computer modeling to analyze water quality).
199. For an excellent discussion on the relationships of fact pleading, no-
tice pleading, and standing, see Roberts, supra note 1, at 390. Generally, fact
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pleading specificity argue that the standing requirement has es-
sentially become an "exercise in artfully drawn pleadings." 200
This criticism is based upon the belief that litigation should be
resolved on the merits, rather than pleadings fashioned to meet
standing requirements. 20 ' Nevertheless, the revival of fact plead-
ing emerged through the causation analysis in Warth - a highly
criticized case. 20 2 In Warth, Justice Powell, writing for the major-
ity, required that specific facts be pled in order to satisfy the
"fairly traceable" component of standing.20 3 Justice Brennan,
dissenting in Warth,20 4 and commentators 20 5 have criticized the
return of specificity in pleadings as inconsistent with the liberal
notice pleading standard of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 20 6 Such criticism is valid since fact pleading hands judges
an instrument that enables them to avoid addressing the merits of
an unfavored case. 20 7
pleading is a description of the Field Code which required a "plain and concise
statement of the facts constituting a cause of action without unnecessary repeti-
tion." Id. at 395 (quoting Act to Amend the Code of Procedure, ch. 479, § 142,
1851 N.Y. Laws 887). This pleading system became unpopular because it failed
to produce consistency regarding what constituted an adequate averment. Id. at
396. Eventually, fact pleading was abolished by rule 8(a) which required "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Id. at 396 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Any further doubt of the demise of
fact pleading was removed by the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson where the
Supreme Court held all elements of a plaintiff's claim were to be liberally con-
strued. Id. at 396-97 (citing 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
200. E.g., Jeanne A. Compitello, Comment, Organizational Standing in Envi-
ronmental Litigation, 6 ToURo L. REV. 295, 309-10 (1990) (citing GOVERNMENTAL
INSTITUTES, supra note 83, at 45).
201. 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1286 (1969) ("Lawsuits should be determined on their merits and
according to the dictates of justice, rather than in terms of whether or not the
averments in the paper pleadings have been artfully drawn."); see GOVERNMEN-
TAL INSTITUTES, supra note 83, at 45; Albert, supra note 1, at 425-26 (standing
should be considered together with merits of case); Scott, supra note 1, at 667
(standing cases may turn on technical pleading rules).
202. See, e.g., KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 332 (2d ed.
1983); C. Douglas Floyd, The Justiciability Decisions of the Burger Court, 60 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 862, 919 (1985); Nichol, Causation, supra note 1, at 195; Roberts,
supra note 1, at 429.
203. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
204. Id. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Brennan
wrote that "[t]o require [plaintiffs] to allege such facts is to require them to
prove their case on paper in order to get into court at all, reverting to the form
of fact pleading long abjured in the federal courts." Id.
205. For a discussion of the criticisms of pleading specificity in the context
of Article III standing, see supra note 202.
206. For Judge Aldisert's criticism of this development in PIRG, see supra
note 155.
207. See Nichol, Causation, supra note 1, at 185 (stating causation require-
ments are easily manipulated to satisfy judge's desire to reach merits of case).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In PIRG, the Third Circuit essentially applies the conven-
tional liberal standing guidelines set forth in Sierra Club, SCRAP,
Valley Forge, and Duke Power to an environmental group plaintiff.20 8
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit, although ignoring Lujan, feign-
edly attempted to define the Duke Power causal relationship test
with some stringency. 20 9 In practice, however, the district courts
have yet to utilize the PIRG causal formulation to prevent a case
from reaching the merits. The Third Circuit's three-part causa-
tion test has shown itself to be no more stringent than earlier
cases where a permit exceedance automatically satisfied the causal
requirement. A pleading pattern has developed which will result
in environmental groups satisfying the causation requirement: (1)
a defendant's discharge permit indicates a type of exceedance; (2)
an EPA report explains the effects of that type of exceedance; and
(3) an environmental group supplies members' affidavits com-
plaining of the type of injury supported by the EPA report.2 10
Therefore, an environmental group plaintiff, suing under the
Clean Water Act, can avoid causation hurdles by careful pleading.
The environmental group, however, must be certain that the al-
leged injuries correspond with EPA's conclusions on the effects of
a particular discharge exceedance. 211
In PIRG, the Supreme Court refused to grant defendant PDT
certiorari212 and the consistent polluter remained punished.
Consequently, effluent dischargers subject to Clean Water Act
provisions, will have a more difficult time preventing a federal
court from reaching the merits of its case. More specifically, a
discharge violator will not be able to argue that an already pol-
luted waterway precludes an environmental group plaintiff from
208. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's application of Article III stand-
ing requirements in PIRG, see supra notes 126-54 and accompanying text.
209. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's three-part definition of the Duke
Power causation requirement, see supra notes 133-49 and accompanying text.
210. See Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Yates Indus.,
Inc., 757 F. Supp. 438 (D.N.J. 1991); Public Interest Research Group of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Rice, 774 F. Supp. 317 (D.N.J. 1991); Public Interest Research
Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Star Enter., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 655 (D.N.J. 1991).
211. See, e.g., Rice, 774 F. Supp. at 321-24 (defendant exceeded limits on
ammonia discharge; EPA found ammonia contributes to unpleasant odor; affi-
ants asserted water had unpleasant odor; causation requirement satisfied); Star
Enter., Inc., 771 F. Supp. at 661-63 (defendant exceeded limitations on sus-
pended solids discharge; EPA report stated excess suspended solids decreases
visibility of water; affiants asserted water had cloudy appearance; causation re-
quirement satisfied).
212. PIRG, 111 S. Ct. 1018 (1991).
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meeting Article III standing requirements. Although the continu-
ation of liberal standing requirements flies in the face of the re-
cent, more stringent standing formulations made by the Supreme
Court, liberal standing requirements certainly assist environmen-
tal group plaintiffs in pursuing the restructuring and cleanup of
this nation's natural resources. Ultimately, however, the Third
Circuit's attempt to cloak the liberality of its reformulation of the
Duke Power causal element fails to clarify the amorphous standing
doctrine and adds to the growing standing quagmire.
Arthur G. Carine, III
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